

CASE NO. 2025-108-P

1 why the Motion to Disqualify should not be stricken or denied as untimely pursuant to PRJDC 38.1(A)
2 and PRJDC 38.4. On September 18, 2026, the Respondent filed *The Honorable Judge Michele Fiore's*
3 *Supplemental Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion to Disqualify*
4 *Commissioners Stefanie Humphrey, John Krmpotic and Joseph Sanford Due to the Appearance of*
5 *Impropriety and Bias Which Constitutes a Violation of Due Process if They Remain on the Panel*
6 *("Supplemental Memorandum")*. On September 22, 2026, the Special Counsel filed *Special Counsel's*
7 *Response to Respondent's Supplemental Memorandum of Points and Authorities to Disqualify*
8 *Commissioners* ("Response").
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10 On October 6, 2026, the Commission issued its *Order Regarding Motion to Disqualify*
11 *Commissioners Stefanie Humphrey, John Krmpotic and Joseph Sanford and Granting Special*
12 *Counsel's Motion for Subpoenas* ("Order"). The Commission declined to deny the Motion to Disqualify
13 as untimely and instead ordered that the Commission would forward the Respondent's Declaration filed
14 with the Motion to Disqualify ("Declaration") to Commissioners Humphrey, Krmpotic and Sanford and
15 require a written answer from the Commissioners admitting or denying the allegations and setting forth
16 any additional facts on the question of disqualification pursuant to PRJDC 38.4.
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18 On October 6, 2026, the Commission staff forwarded the Declaration to the Commissioners. On
19 October 7, 2026, Chairwoman Humphrey filed *Commission Chairwoman Stefanie Humphrey's Answer*
20 *Denying Bias*, Vice Chairman Krmpotic filed *Commission Vice Chairman John Krmpotic's Answer*
21 *Denying Bias*, and Commissioner Sanford filed *Commission Member Joe Sanford's Answer Denying*
22 *Bias* (hereinafter, "Commissioners' Answers"). On October 8, 2026, the Respondent filed *The*
23 *Honorable Judge Michele Fiore's Reply in Support of Motion to Disqualify Commissioners Stefanie*
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1 *Humphrey, John Krmpotic and Joseph Sanford Due to the Appearance of Impropriety and Bias Which*
2 *Constitutes a Violation of Due Process if They Remain on the Panel (“Reply in Support”).*¹

3 **II. Statement of Facts**

4 The Commission is composed of seven members consisting of two judges or justices appointed
5 by the Supreme Court, two members of the State Bar of Nevada appointed by its Board of Governors
6 and three lay members (not members of the legal profession) appointed by the Governor. *See Nev.*
7 *Const. Art 6, §21 (2).* According to the Commissioners’ Answers, Chairwoman Stefanie Humphrey
8 was originally appointed to the Commission as an alternate member in 2015 by Governor Sandoval.
9 She was appointed as a regular member of the Commission in 2018 and reappointed in 2019 by
10 Governor Sandoval, and in 2023 by Governor Sisolak. Commissioner Humphrey’s current term ends in
11 2027. Contrary to Counsel’s sworn declaration attached in support of the Motion to Disqualify,
12 Commissioner Humphrey was never appointed nor reappointed by Governor Lombardo.
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14 Vice Chairman John Krmpotic was originally appointed to the Commission as an alternate
15 member in 2015 by Governor Sandoval. He was appointed as a regular member of the Commission in
16 2018 by Governor Sandoval and reappointed in 2021 by Governor Sisolak, and in 2025 by Governor
17 Lombardo. Commissioner Krmpotic’s current term ends in 2029.
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19 Commissioner Joseph Sanford was originally appointed to the Commission as an alternate
20 member in 2018 by Governor Sandoval. He was reappointed as an alternate member in 2019 by
21 Governor Sandoval and in 2023 by Governor Sisolak. He was appointed as a regular member of the
22 Commission in 2025 by Governor Lombardo. Commissioner Sanford’s current term ends in 2029.
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26 ¹The Respondent filed the Reply in Support upon receipt of the Commissioners’ Answers. Neither the Commission’s Interim
27 Order nor PRJDC 38.4 contemplate or authorize a party to file such a pleading. Furthermore, Special Counsel was
28 not provided an opportunity to file an Opposition to the Motion to Disqualify based upon the Commission’s Interim Order,
and the Respondent was previously admonished to strictly comply with the Commission’s procedural rules.
Notwithstanding, the Commission has considered the Respondent’s Reply in Support upon receipt of the Commissioners’
Answers in reaching this decision.

III. Standards of Law

The Commission shall adopt rules of procedure for the conduct of its hearings and any other procedural rules it deems necessary to carry out its duties. Nev. Const. Art 6, § 21 (7). NRS 1.462 proclaims proceedings before the Commission as civil matters in which the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure apply, except as otherwise provided by the statutory provisions governing the Commission (NRS 1.425 to 1.4695, inclusive) or the procedural rules adopted by the Commission. The Commission has adopted the Procedural Rules of the Nevada Commission on Judicial Discipline (“PRJDC”).

The Commission’s Procedural Rules relevant to a party seeking disqualification of a Commission member state:

- A. Any party to a Commission hearing or proceeding who seeks to disqualify a Commission member or sitting alternate member for actual or implied bias or prejudice or other cause must file an affidavit specifying the facts upon which the disqualification is sought. A challenge for cause may be taken on any of the grounds relating to jurors enumerated in NRS 16.050, as applicable. The affidavit of a party represented by an attorney must be accompanied by a certificate of the attorney of record that the affidavit is filed in good faith and not interposed for delay. The affidavit must be filed not more than thirty days after service of the order setting hearing. The Commission will forward the filed affidavit to the Commission member sought to be disqualified.
- B. The Commission member against whom an affidavit alleging bias or prejudice or other cause is filed shall proceed no further with the matter and file a written answer with the Commission clerk within five days after receiving the affidavit admitting or denying the allegations and setting forth any additional facts on the question of disqualification.
- C. The Commission must hear and determine the Commission member’s disqualification pursuant to PRJDC 3. The Commission may disqualify any member who by reason of actual or implied bias would either be prevented from adjudicating the matter in a fair and impartial manner or, due to an appearance of impropriety, be prevented from adjudicating the matter in a manner consistent with the public’s confidence in the Commission. The Commission shall replace any disqualified Commission member with an alternate Commission member, if available.

PRJDC 38.

By analogy, the standard for disqualification of a judge is where the judge’s impartiality might be reasonably questioned. *Ybarra v. State*, 127 Nev. 47, 51, 247 P.3d 269, 271 (2011). The test for whether a judge’s impartiality might be reasonably questioned is objective and courts must decide

1 whether a reasonable person, knowing all the facts, would harbor reasonable doubts about a judge's
2 impartiality. *Id.* at 51. A judge has a duty to preside to the conclusion of all proceedings, in the absence
3 of some statute, rule of court, ethical standard, or compelling reason to the contrary. *Las Vegas*
4 *Downtown Redevelopment v. District Court*, 116 Nev. 640, 643, 5 P.3d 1059, 1061 (2000). A judge is
5 presumed to be impartial, and the burden is on the party asserting the challenge to establish sufficient
6 factual grounds warranting disqualification. *Ybarra*, 127 Nev. at 51. Additionally, the Court must give
7 substantial weight to a judge's determination that the judge does not voluntarily disqualify themselves,
8 and the judge's decision cannot be overturned without clear abuse of discretion. *Matter of Dunleavy*,
9 104 Nev. 784, 788, 769 P.2d 1271, 1274 (1988).

11 **IV. Discussion**

12 In the Motion to Disqualify, the Respondent seeks to disqualify Chairwoman Stefanie
13 Humphrey, Vice Chairman John Krmpotic, and Commissioner Joseph Sanford (hereinafter
14 "Commissioners") for the appearance of bias alleging each of the Commissioners was appointed by
15 Governor Joe Lombardo. Respondent argues "[t]his is not a case in which a governor merely
16 performed a routine appointment function." Motion to Disqualify, p. 2, lns. 6-7. Respondent further
17 argues that there is an appearance of bias because Governor Lombardo is a potential witness in this
18 matter, he was named as a victim in the federal proceeding, and testified in the federal proceeding
19 against Judge Fiore. *Id.*, p. 2, lns. 7-10.

21 The United States Constitution and Nevada Constitution guarantee no person shall be deprived
22 of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. *See* U.S. Const., Amend. XIV, §1 and Nev.
23 Const., Art. 1, § 8(2). The Nevada Supreme Court has concluded that "commissioned judges in this
24 state have a protected interest in their judicial offices under the Fourteenth Amendment." *Mosely v.*
25 *Nev. Com'n on Judicial Discipline*, 117 Nev. 371, 378, 22 P.3d 655, 659 (2001). Moreover, the Court
26 noted that "[a] fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process." *Id.* at 377-78; 22 P.3d
27 655, 659 (citing *In re Murchison*, 349 U.S. 133, 136, 75 S.Ct. 623 (1955)). The Court further stated that
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1 [a]n adjudicator's actual bias against a party is constitutionally unacceptable and, in some situations, an
2 implied probability of bias constitutes a deprivation of due process. *Id.* at 378; 22 P.3d 655, 659 (citing
3 *Withrow v. Larkin*, 421 U.S. 35, 47, 95 S.Ct. 1456 (1975)).

4 Given the Commission's fundamental responsibility to determine, in part, the requirements for
5 judicial disqualification based on bias, prejudice, and appearances of impropriety, the Commission, too,
6 has tremendous regard for its own commitment to ensure that Commission members satisfy the same
7 considerations when presiding over matters affecting the public's right to judicial integrity and the
8 constitutional rights of judges. In this matter, the Respondent has argued that the three Commissioners
9 should be disqualified from presiding in this matter based upon "not whether a particular adjudicator
10 believes he or she can be fair, but whether a reasonable observer would conclude that the surrounding
11 circumstances create a constitutionally unacceptable probability of bias." *See* Motion to Disqualify, pg.
12 8. In support of this notion, the Respondent relies, in part, on the challenges for disqualification of a
13 Commission member pursuant to PRJDC 38.4 wherein grounds for disqualification are the same as
14 those relating to jurors under NRS 16.050. *Id.* at 10. In particular, the Respondent asserts that NRS
15 16.050(1)(d)² is instructive as a basis for disqualification on the grounds that the Governor, who is a
16 potential witness in this matter, is not himself serving as a commissioner, but the Commissioners are
17 serving by virtue of his appointment. *Id.* at 11. As argued by the Respondent, the Commissioners are
18 therefore "asked to adjudicate a matter arising from the same underlying facts in which their appointing
19 authority testified as a substantive witness, and where the Commission intends to rely upon that
20 testimony in determining discipline. *Id.* All said, the Respondent ultimately maintains that "[t]he
21 controlling due process concern is not that these Commissioners are subjectively biased, but that the
22 objective circumstances create a constitutionally intolerable risk of bias." *See* Supplemental
23 Memorandum, pg. 6.

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28 ² NRS 16.050(1)(d) allows for a challenge to a juror on the basis that the juror "served as a juror or [was] a witness on a
previous trial between the same parties for the same cause of action or being then a witness therein."

1 Respondent cites numerous cases to support her contention that the gubernatorial appointment
2 of the lay Commissioners renders them conflicted as a matter of law due to an objective appearance of
3 bias.³ However, each of these cases is significantly distinguishable from the matter before the
4 Commission. Namely, the judges in those cases had a personal stake in the underlying matter or other
5 factors that challenged their neutrality; whereas, here, the Respondent argues there is effectively a
6 presumption of Commissioner partiality based solely on their appointments to the Commission by an
7 executive who may be a witness in the case.

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9 The cases do not support this presumptive bias and instead involve systemic breakdowns in
10 neutrality not present in the matter currently before the Commission. In *Caperton*, there was a targeted
11 and significant \$3 million personal contribution by a litigant into the judge's campaign. In *Aetna*, a
12 Supreme Court Justice cast the deciding vote in a precedential case involving a bad-faith insurance case
13 while simultaneously having his own active personal lawsuit with a different insurance company raising
14 the same issues. In *Withrow*, the primary issues involved a blending of investigatory, prosecutorial and
15 adjudicatory roles by the judge in the same proceeding. In *Tumey*, the town mayor sat as a judge and
16 only got paid if he convicted the defendant, and any fines collected as a result of the judge's decisions
17 went directly into the town's general budget, which the mayor managed – again, a direct financial
18 incentive in underlying judicial matters.

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20 On the contrary, a constitutionally mandated and routine gubernatorial appointment of
21 Commissioners, without additional evidence of some personal stake in the outcome, shares none of
22 these characteristics. The appointment of the lay Commissioners by the Governor in Nevada is a
23 constitutional and statutory duty.⁴ See Nev. Const., Art. 6, §§21(2)(c) and 21(4); See also NRS 1.445.
24 The Commissioners' roles are made "permanent" for their term of office at the moment they take their
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27 ³ Respondent's citations include: *Caperton v. A.T. Masset Coal Co.*, 556 U.S. 868, 129 S.Ct. 2252 (2009); *Tumey v. Ohio*,
28 273 U.S. 510 (1927); *Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie*, 475 U.S. 813 (1986); and *Withrow v. Larkin*, 421 U.S. 35, 95 S.Ct. 1456
(1975).

⁴ Gubernatorial appointments are governed by the Governor's Boards and Commissions Department. See
<https://www.gov.nv.gov/board-appts/>.

1 oath, wherein their tenures are secured at the time of appointment. *Id.*; *See also* NRS 281.020 and
2 282.010. The Commissioners may only be removed for malfeasance or nonfeasance in the performance
3 of their duties. *See* NRS 232A.030(2) and NRS 283.440. Accordingly, Commissioners are entrusted to
4 act independently upon taking their oaths.

5 Fundamentally, the Respondent attempts to analogize these cases which involve evidence of a
6 judge's personal stakes in a matter to a case in which there is **no** evidence of any bias and firm denials
7 of any bias by the Commissioners. In fact, the Respondent acknowledges that this is not about actual
8 bias, but that the appointment alone establishes a presumption of partiality. If that were the standard, the
9 entire judiciary would become paralyzed in federal and state courts where the governor (or President) is
10 named as a party or a witness. For example, any case involving a state or federal agency necessarily
11 establishes the governor or the President, the executive heads of such agencies, as a party. If judges
12 appointed by governors or the President were required, as a matter of law, to recuse themselves when
13 the state or federal government is a party, those cases would stall while disqualifications and
14 reassignments were addressed and it could result in forum-shopping by parties.

15 Respondent correctly notes the precedent of this State that due process "does not require proof
16 of actual bias, instead a court must objectively determine whether the probability of actual bias is too
17 high to ensure the protection of a party's due process rights." *Id.* (citing *Ivey v. Dist. Ct.*, 129 Nev.154,
18 159, 299 P.3d. 354, 357 (2013)). However, in *Ivey*, there was again evidence that a litigant had
19 contributed a substantial donation to the judge's campaign, which still did not establish actual bias to
20 warrant disqualification in the case. Therefore, *Ivey* proves that the principles outlined in *Caperton*
21 apply in exceptional circumstances wherein a private individual's contributions to the judge have a
22 critical and/or disproportionate impact on the judge's decision and/or political survival. Again, all of
23 these attributes are absent in the current matter before the Commission.

24 The Respondent asks the Commission to make a broad determination on its face that the
25 constitutionally required appointment and/or reappointment of certain commissioners by the Governor,
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1 a potential witness in this matter, establishes, without additional facts, that there is a constitutionally
2 impermissible disqualification due to appearance alone. Despite these contentions, the Commission
3 notes precedent from throughout the country declining to apply such a standard to the disqualification
4 of a judge on similar grounds, to be addressed more fully herein.

5 **1. Chairwoman Humphrey**

6 The Respondent's concern about the objective appearance of bias of Chairwoman Humphrey on
7 the basis of her appointment by Governor Lombardo to this Commission has been thwarted by the
8 undisputed fact that Chairwoman Humphrey was neither appointed nor reappointed by Governor
9 Lombardo. The Respondent's sole basis for alleging disqualification of Chairwoman Humphrey was
10 that her appointment to the Commission by the Governor created a constitutionally impermissible
11 appearance of impropriety based upon the appointment alone because the Governor is a potential
12 witness. The Respondent's Motion to Disqualify Chairwoman Humphrey is factually and legally
13 unfounded.
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15 **2. Vice Chairman Krmpotic and Commissioner Sanford**

16 Vice Chairman Krmpotic stated that after having served as a member of the Commission for
17 approximately 10 years, Governor Lombardo reappointed him in 2025 to another term of office.
18 Likewise, after serving as an alternate member of the Commission for approximately 7 years,
19 Commissioner Sanford was appointed as a regular member by Governor Lombardo. Both deny any
20 actual bias and assert that they are able to weigh the credibility of Governor Lombardo as a witness in
21 the same manner as any other witness. The Respondent has not presented any other facts or
22 circumstances relevant to disqualification of these Commissioners in the underlying matter. Instead, the
23 Respondent views these facts, in isolation, as sufficient to support an objective appearance of bias
24 and/or impropriety in adjudicating this matter where the Governor is a potential witness.
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27 The Commission does not dispute the assertions and legal citations cited by the Respondent that
28 certain circumstances may create objective bases for judicial disqualification for appearances of

1 impropriety where actual bias is lacking. However, numerous courts have held that a gubernatorial
2 appointment of a judicial officer alone does not render that judicial officer as biased, nor does it create a
3 constitutionally impermissible appearance of impropriety to require disqualification when the governor
4 is a party to the case. *See State v. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft*, 692 S.W.3d 467 (Tex. 2022); *People*
5 *v. de Jongh*, 64 V.I. 53 (Super. Ct. 2016); *Peterson v. Borst*, 784 N.E.2d 934 (Ind. 2003); *Jourdan v.*
6 *Nationsbanc Mortg. Corp.*, 42 P.3d 1072, 1082 (Alaska 2002); and *Hamlin v. Government of Canal*
7 *Zone ex rel. Parker*, 26 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1928). The Commission finds these cases persuasive and
8 exercises its discretion to apply the same analysis in the instant case.

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10 In *State v. Volkswagen*, 692 S.W.3d 467 (Tex. 2022), the Texas Supreme Court dissected the
11 same cases cited by the Respondent under remarkably similar circumstances; a case known as
12 “Dieselgate” in which the State of Texas brought a civil environmental enforcement action against
13 Volkswagen for allegedly illegal emissions in vehicles. In the case, the defendants argued that the
14 Governor of Texas was able to appoint replacement justices after 2 other justices had conflicts and
15 recused, and such gubernatorial appointment would violate their due process by essentially allowing the
16 state, as a party, to “be the judge of its own cause.” *Id.* However, the court rejected this premise finding
17 no unconstitutional risk of bias based on the routine statutory mechanism of gubernatorial
18 appointments. *Id.* The court held, in part, “[t]he Governor's appointment of two substitute justices to
19 participate in the determination of these cases does not, in and of itself, create a serious risk of actual
20 bias under *Caperton* and therefore does not violate the due-process or due-course-of-law provisions.
21 Nor does it, standing alone, taint the commissioned justices with the appearance of partiality or
22 impropriety under Texas ethical rules.” *Id.* at 479.

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24 In its interpretation of *Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Lavoie*, (475 U.S. at 821), the Texas Supreme
25 Court stated that it “illustrates that mere allegations of bias and prejudice of the type alleged here are
26 insufficient to create a constitutional due-process violation.” *Id.* at 477. Moreover, the Court stated:
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28 Respondents also assert that the Governor should not commission substitute justices
 because commissioning *any* justice or judge pursuant to Section 22.005 would create an

1 appearance of impropriety in the mind of an ordinary person. The argument ignores a
2 fundamental legal principle—justices and judges are presumed to act impartially and
3 honestly. ... Respondents’ theory turns the presumption upside-down: in their view, a
reasonable person would necessarily look askance at even the noblest of judges with
unquestionable ethics if they were commissioned to serve in these cases.

4 *Id.* at 478. (internal citations omitted).

5 In *Peterson v. Borst*, 784 N.E.2d 934 (Ind. 2003), the Indiana Supreme Court found that the
6 appointment by the mayor of the judge to the Cultural Development Commission did not require him to
7 recuse himself in case in which mayor was an appellant. The Court stated:

8 “[The court does] not believe a reasonable objective person would conclude that service
9 on the Cultural Development Commission generates an “economic interest” in the
10 outcome of this lawsuit. ...

11 Specifically, a judge's recusal is not required because the appointing authority is a
12 litigant.

13 *Id.* at 937 (citing *Hamlin v. Gov’t of Canal Zone*, 26 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1928) (judge not disqualified to
14 pass on the removal power of the governor who appointed him).

15 In *Jourdan v. Nationsbank Mortg. Corp.*, 42 P.3d 1072, 1082 (Alaska 2002), the Alaska
16 Supreme Court addressed an allegation that there was judicial bias because the trial judge had been
17 appointed by the governor who was a personal friend of an opposing party. The Court stated that “being
18 appointed by a governor who allegedly was a friend of one of the parties does not in itself constitute a
19 close enough connection to merit recusal of the judge.” *Id.*

20 In *Hamlin v. Government of Canal Zone ex rel. Parker*, 26 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1928), the Fifth
21 Circuit Court of Appeals addressed an affidavit of alleged judicial bias filed by a party challenging an
22 executive appointment by the governor of the trial judge in a case wherein the judge was being asked to
23 rule on a matter in which the governor was a party to a lawsuit. The Court determined:

24 That affidavit negated the existence of each of the grounds of disqualification
25 prescribed by the applicable statute dealing with the subject of disqualification of judges.
26 Code of Civil Procedure of Canal Zone, Sec. 8. That affidavit was not rebutted by any
27 evidence of the existence of a prescribed ground for disqualifying the Special Judge. The
28 fact that a judge is the appointee of an official who appointed to a public office or
employment another person whose right to exercise the functions of that office or
employment is brought into question in a suit or judicial proceeding does not have the

1 effect of disqualifying such judge to act in that suit or proceeding. It was not made to
2 appear that the Governor of the Panama Canal was a party in interest in this suit, nor that
3 the Special Judge had any disqualifying interest in this suit or on any other ground was
4 legally incompetent to act as a judge therein.

5 *Id.* at 162.

6 Finally, in *People v. de Jongh*, 64 V.I. 53 (Super. Ct. 2016), a trial court in the U.S. Virgin
7 Islands considered a matter in which the prosecution argued that the judge had a conflict solely because
8 he was originally appointed to the bench by a governor who was now the criminal defendant before the
9 judge in a criminal embezzlement case. The Court stated:

10 The People base this claim on the assumption that a judge or justice appointed by the
11 governor would be biased in that governor's favor and disqualified, as a result, from
12 presiding over any case involving her or him. It follows then, the People contend, that
13 the converse also holds: a judge or justice not reappointed by a governor would be
14 biased against that governor and disqualified from presiding over any case in which the
15 same governor is a party. In other words, the People assume, on the one hand, that that a
16 judge or justice owes some allegiance or affinity, or even good will, to the governor who
17 appoints her or him to the bench and, if not reappointed, then that judge or justice would
18 be disloyal or perhaps harbor ill will towards the same governor. In either instance, bias
19 is shown and the judge or justice is disqualified. But both assumptions are flawed.

20 ...

21 While this is an issue of first impression in the Virgin Islands, other jurisdictions have
22 held that “[t]he mere fact that a judge was appointed to that position ... by a person who
23 is now a party, counsel, or potential witness before her will not ordinarily suffice to
24 warrant disqualifying that judge.”

25 *Id.* at 67-68. (citing Flamm, *Judicial Disqualification* § 8.10 (footnotes omitted). The Court further
26 determined:

27 Were we to assume that judges or justices are biased toward the Governor, whether in
28 his favor or not, simply because he exercised the responsibility the people, through the
Legislature, entrusted in him concerning the judiciary, we would in essence be adopting
a *per se* rule of disqualification: that a current or former judge or justice is disqualified
from presiding over any case involving the governor who appointed him and further that
a former judge or justice is also disqualified from presiding over any case involving the
governor who did not reappoint him. From there the slope would get very slippery.

29 *Id.* at 69.

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1 **V. Decision**

2 The Commission⁵ finds the aforementioned cases, albeit not binding, constitute overwhelming
3 support to deny the Motion to Disqualify on basis that the Commissioners' mere reappointments to the
4 Commission by the Governor who may be a witness in this matter, without additional evidence of
5 conflict, does not establish a violation of due process.


6 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, the Motion to Disqualify is DENIED.

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8 The Honorable Kendra Bertschy is authorized to sign this order on behalf of the full
9 Commission.

10 IT IS SO ORDERED.

11 DATED this 13th day of October, 2026.

12 STATE OF NEVADA
13 COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE

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15 _____
16 Honorable Kendra Bertschy, Commissioner
17 Presiding Officer

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28 ⁵ Presiding Officer Bertschy and Commissioners Schifalacqua, Armstrong, and Halstead voted unanimously in support of
this Decision. Chairwoman Humphrey, Vice-Chairman Krmpotic and Commissioner Sanford took no part in this Decision.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify on this 13th day of October, 2026, I transmitted a copy of the foregoing ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISQUALIFY COMMISSIONERS STEFANIE HUMPHREY, JOHN KRMPOTIC AND JOSEPH SANFORD, via email addressed to:

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